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develop enhanced competency they seem to threaten the values associated with 
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  1. Introduction 
 
On the 27th of November 2019, Lee Sedol announced his retirement from 
the professional world of Go-playing.1 Sedol was an eighteen-time world 
champion of the fiendishly difficult Chinese strategy game. He was a long-time 
celebrity in his home country of South Korea but attained international notoriety 
in March 2016 when he was defeated, 4-1, in a five-game challenge match 
against Alpha Go, an artificially intelligent Go-playing computer program, created 
by the software company DeepMind.  
 
Sedol did not announce his retirement with a sense of satisfaction about 
what he achieved in his career. He did so out of a sense of despair. He told 
reporters that he felt there was no point in continuing with the game because he 
could no longer compete with the machines. He had come to the realization that 
 
1 For Lee Sedol’s retirement and associated statements, see: 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-50573071 
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he was no longer "at the top even if [he became] the number one”.2 Sedol’s sense 
of despair at the rise of artificial intelligence is shared by others. Commenting on 
Sedol’s loss to Alpha Go, Carissa Veliz notes that there is something deeply sad 
about the whole affair. Clearly, the creation of Alpha Go marked a significant 
technological breakthrough, but it also signalled the loss of something important 
to humankind. As she put it:3 
 
“What is most surprising about the match is that the outcome did not feel 
like a win for humanity. It did not feel similar to when we conquer a disease, 
or when the first human being landed on the moon. It felt like we might be 
losing more than what we might be gaining.” 
 
In the remainder of this article we examine what it is we might be losing to 
machines like Alpha Go. We focus, in particular, on what we might be losing in 
the world of work. As AI and other automating technologies are increasingly 
used to augment and replace human task performance in the workplace, there is, 
we argue, a significant risk to the value of human achievement. This, in turn, 
makes it difficult for us to ensure that people have access to meaningful work. 
And while this argument focuses specifically on the impact of automation in the 
workplace it may have broader implications for the impact of automation on 
human life more generally. 
 
 We present our analysis in four stages. First, we clarify in a bit more detail 
the phenomenon of workplace automation and the idea of meaningful work. 
Second, we look at the nature of human achievement and identify four conditions 
that need to be satisfied in order for us to say that a human or group of humans 
has achieved some goal or end. Third, we argue that workplace automation 
undermines our capacity to individually and collectively satisfy these conditions 
for achievement, thus resulting in an ‘achievement gap’ in the automated 
workplace. Fourth, we consider the policy implications of this argument. In 
particular, we outline ways of retaining a space for human achievement in the 
automated workplace, or otherwise guaranteeing meaningfulness in the 
workplace. In doing so, we draw explicit analogies between our concern about 
the emergence of achievement gaps in the workplace and closely related policy 
concerns about responsibility gaps arising from the widespread use of 
automating technologies (e.g. Mattias 2004; Nyholm 2018 and 2020; and Tigard 
2020a and 2020b). Indeed, we suggest that the achievement gaps we discuss in 
this paper are a type of positive responsibility gap, and are thus the inverse of 
the negative responsibility gaps that have attracted a lot of attention in debates 
about roboethics and AI ethics. 
 
 
2 Ibid 
3 These remarks come from a blogpost Veliz wrote after watching a documentary 
about the Alpha Go story, available at: 
https://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2019/10/a-sad-
victory/?fbclid=IwAR1CIVsJI3qm4fW-
TmNOjN67x7UR_fNJkR1akVqS7DZC804pzqUhhBMBpgQ 
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2. Meaningful Work and Workplace Automation 
 
This paper is concerned with the impact of automation on our capacity for 
achievement in the workplace. To better understand both the scope and 
limitations of our analysis it is important to clarify what we understand by the 
phenomena of work and automation, and then to consider the relationship 
between achievement and meaningful work. 
 
 Let’s start with the idea of work. Work is a tricky phenomenon to define 
(Danaher 2019, ch 2): some people adopt expansive definitions of work, defining 
it in such a way that it includes virtually all activities that humans might engage 
in; others adopt more limited definitions, tying work to specific, economic 
activities. For present purposes, we use one of these more limited definitions. We 
focus on what has been called work ‘in the economic sense’ (Gorz 1989; Frayne 
2015). This form of work consists of skills (physical, cognitive, emotional etc) 
that are performed by individuals in return for some kind of economic reward. 
The skills performed by the individuals can be referred to as work-related ‘tasks’. 
Usually, these tasks are performed with a view to producing a commodifiable 
output, either a good or service, that can be bought and sold on a market. 
Workplaces then consist of individuals, either singly or collectively, performing 
work-related tasks with a view to producing such commodifiable outputs. 
 
 Work, so-defined, often has a nested task structure. That is to say, one set 
of work-related tasks can produce an output that then contributes to another set 
of tasks that contributes to the overall commodifiable output. For example, in the 
manufacture of a complex technological product like a computer, one group of 
workers may be focused on producing designs or plans for the computer, 
another group may be focused on manufacturing the microchips, another on the 
casing and packaging, and still another may be dedicated to marketing and 
selling the product. Each group of workers produces an output that contributes 
to the overall commodifiable output. The nested task structure is due to 
specialization within the workplace, a phenomenon highlighted long ago by 
Adam Smith (Smith 1776). The nested task structure of work is important when 
it comes to discussions of achievement in the workplace because the output of a 
given task (or set of tasks) is one of the key variables when it comes to assessing 
the value of the achievement associated with the work. A worker may, for 
example, be contributing to some valuable commodifiable output through their 
individual work tasks, but the outputs associated with their work tasks may be 
relatively trivial or easy to achieve. If this is the case, their particular work task 
may not be a significant source of achievement. To take an extreme example, a 
legal secretary whose only job is to staple together sheafs of paper is doing 
something that is relatively trivial and easy to achieve. It is not clear how their 
job could be a significant source of achievement (though we return to examples 
like this, again, in section 5).  
 
 Work, so defined, is not the same thing as a job though they are related 
concepts. A job is a defined role within a workplace associated with the 
performance of a more or less specified collection of work-related tasks. Put 
another way, work is a general condition under which tasks get performed 
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(namely, a condition of economic reward) whereas a job is a collection of such 
tasks associated with a specific workplace identity. These tasks must be 
connected to the commodifiable output, but apart from that they can be more or 
less arbitrarily defined. For example, one person might have the job of being a 
personnel manager within a workplace, but the precise set of work-related tasks 
relevant to this job might shift and change over time. At one point in time the 
major focus might be on providing adequate skills-training to the workforce, at 
another point in time the major focus might be on improving workplace morale 
and so on. This is important because jobs can often be redefined or altered over 
time to include different sets of work-related tasks. This makes a difference 
when it comes to assessing the impact of automation on work. As we point out 
below, automation may result in a redrawing of the task boundaries of particular 
jobs without necessarily resulting in a net loss of jobs. 
 
 Finally, in relation to the definition of work, it is worth distinguishing 
between meaningful and non-meaningful forms of work. ‘Meaningful work’ is 
work that consists of a set of tasks that provides workers with meaning, where 
this is cashed out in terms of the general properties commonly associated with 
meaning in life. This could prompt a lengthy divagation into the nature of 
meaning in life but we will take a shortcut around that topic in this paper. In our 
approach to meaning in work we are influenced by Susan Wolf’s account of what 
it is to have a meaningful life. Meaning in life, according to Wolf (2010), has both 
a subjective component and an objective component. As Wolf sees things, a 
person has a meaningful life if she is engaged in activities and projects that she is 
passionate about, and that can also be recognised as valuable from a wider, not 
purely subjective perspective. We think of meaningful work in a similar way: it 
should create a subjective sense of meaning, on the one hand, but it should also 
be work that has characteristics that can be more generally recognised as the 
sorts of characteristics objectively associated with meaningful work, on the other 
hand (for an extended discussion of such characteristics, see, e.g., Smids, Nyholm, 
& Berkers 2020, pp. 506-510). 
 
What does this mean in practice? At a minimum, two conditions need to 
be satisfied in order for work to be meaningful: (a) the overarching output 
produced by the workplace must be valuable and must be perceived by the 
workers to be valuable and (b) the individual worker’s job, within the 
overarching structure of the workplace, must consist of sub-tasks that are 
themselves valuable (and perceived to be valuable).  So, for example, someone 
could work as a financial trader within a workplace that specializes in facilitating 
illegal arms trades that ultimately harm many people, or, alternatively, they 
could work as a trader that facilitates investments in healthcare in developing 
countries that benefit many people. In both cases they might perform very 
similar tasks as part of their jobs and find these tasks to be meaningful and 
valuable, but when facilitating  illegal arms trades they are not engaged in a 
meaningful form of work because the overarching output of their workplace 
lacks value (indeed, it is actively disvaluable). All that said, as we shall point out 
later in this paper, meaningful work can also include other properties not 
specifically linked to the output of the workplace (Ghaeus and Herzog 2016; 
Smids, Nyholm and Berkers 2020; Veltman 2016). For example, feeling as though 
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you belong to a community of fellow workers, or that you are gaining mastery 
over some skillset, are often tagged as features of meaningful work, even though 
these things do not strictly require a valuable task output – they require, at most, 
a value neutral output.  
 
 So much for work. What about workplace automation? Very generally, 
automation is the practice of using machines, rather than humans, to perform 
work-related tasks. Automation has been a feature of the workplace since the 
dawn of the industrial revolution (Frey 2019). Some people think that the 
current wave of AI-based automation could eventually lead to the end of the 
majority human workforces (Ford 2015; Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014; 
Manyika et al 2017; Danaher 2019; Susskind 2020); others are more skeptical 
(Autor 2015). This is not the place to adjudicate those disputes. What is 
important for present purposes is that workplace automation can take different 
forms, two of which are worth singling out for the purposes of this article: 
 
Total Replacement: This happens when a machine replaces all the work-
related tasks associated with a given job. As a result, a human worker will 
typically lose their job and a machine will perform all the work-related 
tasks that were once associated with that job. 
 
Collaborative Displacement: This happens when a machine replaces 
some of the work-related tasks associated with a given work output but a 
sufficient number of human-performed tasks are retained such that 
humans still have jobs but have to collaborate with the machines to 
produce the output. This often leads to a redrawing of the boundaries of a 
given job. 
 
Collaborative displacement, in its turn, can take a number of different forms. It 
would be impossible to enumerate all the possible forms it can take but three 
would seem to be particularly important when it comes to assessing the impact 
of workplace automation on achievement. 
 
 The first is what might be called “supervisory” or “directive” 
collaboration. This arises whenever humans formulate the abstract plans or 
work programs that the machines implement. For example, a group of 
automobile engineers might design a car, providing detailed blueprints for its 
specifications and information on how it ought to be put together. These 
blueprints could then be fed into a machine (or group of machines) that actually 
build the car. The humans here are responsible for the creative and intellectual 
part of the work. The machine does the physical gruntwork. 
 
 The second is what might be called “maintenance” collaboration. This 
arises whenever humans have to maintain the machines that produce the work 
output. To continue with the automobile example, once the machines have 
started the manufacturing process, it is quite likely that they will breakdown or 
encounter operational difficulties. Skilled machinists and maintenance workers 
may then be required to step in to repair or fix the machines, or 
reprogram/repurpose them to fit the changing demands of the workplace. 
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 The third is what might be called “order-following” collaboration. This is 
essentially the inverse of “supervisory” or “directive” collaboration. In this case, 
the machine comes up with the abstract plans or work programs that human 
workers then implement. So, suppose that instead of designing the car, the 
humans use a machine learning algorithm to figure out the best way to make a 
fuel efficient, aerodynamic car. The algorithm uses a database of pre-existing 
designs to do this. After the algorithm settles on a preferred design, the humans 
go off and build the car. Here, the humans do the physical gruntwork while the 
machine is responsible for the creative and intellectual work. 
 
 These examples are obviously abstract and, perhaps, a little too neat. In 
the real world, multiple forms of collaborative displacement may occur at the 
same time and some may be more partial or incomplete than those sketched 
above. Nevertheless, the different forms of collaborative displacement make a 
difference to the kinds of achievement that are available to human workers. 
Humans might still have jobs, even with rampant automation, but those jobs 
might not allow for meaningful work because the kinds of achievement they 
enable are relatively minimal. The obvious intuition here is that a human that 
just follows the orders given to it by a machine has access to a less valuable kind 
of workplace achievement than one that supervises or directs a machine. But is 
that intuition correct? We will examine this in more detail below, after we have 
said something more about the nature of achievement. 
 
3. What is an achievement? 
 
Achievements are outcomes that are brought about by coordinated 
human activity in such a way that those outcomes can be linked to the efforts of 
individual human agents. The concept of achievement features heavily in many 
philosophical theories of meaning in life and hence can also feature in theories of 
meaningful work. A meaningful life is commonly conceptualized as one in which 
an individual achieves valuable things with their life. Albert Einstein, for 
example, can be said to have lived a meaningful life because he achieved certain 
scientific insights and outputs (the special and general theories of relativity and 
certain key elements of modern quantum theory) through his cognitive efforts. 
That said, his life was not an unqualified success since he failed to achieve a 
grand unified theory of everything, something that both he and the wider physics 
community perceived to be the ultimate goal of their scientific endeavours 
(Folsing 1997). 
 
Achievement is, then, one of the key elements of a meaningful life. It may 
not be the sine qua non of human flourishing but it is at least true to say that a 
life without achievement is impoverished compared to a life with achievement. If 
something threatened or undermined our capacity to have achievements, we 
should be concerned as this could make our lives relatively worse than they 
might otherwise have been. This is particularly true when it comes to our desire 
to secure meaningful forms of work. For better or worse, work occupies the 
centre stage in many people’s lives. They are obliged to do it out of economic and 
practical necessity; and they often associate their identity and self-worth with 
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the work they perform, and many people spend more time every week with 
workplace colleagues than with their families and loved ones (Smids, Nyholm 
and Berkers 2020). If their capacity to achieve things through their work is 
compromised, this would be worthy of careful consideration. 
 
What conditions are relevant to assessing whether someone’s efforts 
count as an achievement? Here we propose a modified account based on 
Bradford’s analytical account of achievement (Bradford 2013 and 2016) and 
Maslen, Savulescu and Hunt’s work on praiseworthiness (2020). It seems 
appropriate to marry these two accounts together since achievements are, in 
essence, a positive manifestation of responsibility. In both philosophical and 
legal debates about responsibility, we are often concerned with what can be 
called negative responsibility: who is to blame (legally/morally) when 
something bad happens? It is important, however, to remember that 
responsibility has a positive, flipside. We can also ask: who deserves praise or 
reward if something good happens? Since we usually talk about an individual’s 
achievements in positive terms – e.g. we celebrate Einstein’s scientific 
achievements – it makes sense to think that assessing whether or not someone 
has achieved something is partly determined by whether or not they deserve 
praise for a positive outcome. 
 
Some people might dispute this. Steven Luper (2014), for example, has 
defended an “achievementist” theory of meaning in life that is strictly neutral on 
whether achievements have objective value. He argues that someone can be 
rightly said to achieve negative outcomes just as easily as they can be said to 
achieve positive outcomes. Achievement, according to Luper, is largely a function 
of whether or not someone is successful in attaining their goals. To take an 
extreme example, a serial killer who set themselves the goal of killing as many 
people as possible, and who succeeds in doing this, can be said to have achieved 
something just as easily as Einstein can be said to have achieved something 
through his scientific successes.  
 
While there might be some merit to such an account of achievement, we 
suggest that it is a counterintuitive idea. If achievements are a key part of 
meaning in life, it would be odd to suggest that they can play this part if they can 
be negative in nature. Accordingly, it is common in theories of meaning to argue 
that a life lacks meaning if it produces negative outcomes in the world (Landau 
2011; Smuts 2013; Metz 2013). Because we find Luper’s view to be 
counterintuitive, in the remainder of this article, we focus on achievements that 
are associated with either positive or non-negative outcomes (i.e. neither good 
nor bad). We include the latter possibility on the grounds that achieving a 
neutral non-negative outcome can still be praiseworthy because (a) it doesn’t 
reduce the level of value in the world and (b) the fact that it was achieved may 
speak to certain virtues or excellences in human agency. For example, it seems 
plausible to suggest that Lee Sedol’s successes as a professional Go-player were 
largely value neutral in nature: his winning the world championship 18 times 
was, from an objective standpoint, neither good nor bad. Nevertheless, his 
successes did speak to some personal virtues or excellences that are worthy of 
praise. 
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With these caveats in mind, we submit that whenever we are assessing 
the value of someone’s achievements, the following four variables need to be 
kept in mind: 
 
(a) The value of the output produced: although producing value 
neutral outcomes can count as an achievement, it is still the 
case that the more objectively valuable the output then the 
greater the achievement, all else being equal (i.e. bearing in 
mind the other variables). 
(b) The nature of causal contribution of the agent: the agent must 
play a significant role in producing the output, specifically the 
output must be a sufficiently non-lucky result of the agent’s 
actions. 
(c) The cost of the agent’s commitment to producing the outcome: 
typically, the more effort, time, attention, stress etc. the greater 
the achievement.4 
(d) The voluntariness of the agent’s actions: a non-voluntary 
commitment to producing an outcome might count as a less of 
an achievement, all else being equal.  
 
The first of these variables has already been discussed. The other three merit 
some further elaboration. Concerning the causal contribution of the agent to the 
output, it seems like commonsense to suggest that this must be significant and 
that the agent has to play a sufficiently ‘non-lucky’ role in producing the outcome 
(Bradford 2013). To use an obvious example, compare Bill Gates to a lottery 
winner. The lottery winner purchases a ticket and this ticket happens to have the 
winning numbers. This results in the lottery winner becoming fantastically 
wealthy. Did the lottery winner achieve their wealth? Hardly. Their purchasing of 
the ticket was a relevant causal factor in producing this outcome (but for the 
purchase of the ticket they would not be wealthy) but it was pure luck whether 
this ticket would actually be the winning one. The lottery winner did not play a 
sufficiently non-lucky role in producing the outcome. Bill Gates, on the other 
hand, was undoubtedly the recipient of much good fortune and luck in life. He 
came from a relatively wealthy background and happened to come of age at the 
exact right time to capitalize on the personal computer revolution. Nevertheless, 
he did exert considerable, deliberate cognitive effort in programming key 
software innovations and managing a successful business (Isaacson 2014). His 
 
4 As will become apparent, we do not think that an agent’s exercising a great 
amount of effort is a necessary condition for something to count as an 
achievement on the part of the agent. Assuming, for example, that Mozart was 
able to compose an opera with a smaller amount of effort than some lesser 
composer, this may not necessarily take away anything from how great of an 
achievement the opera might be on Mozart’s part. In general, however, we 
typically associate achievements with exertions of effort or other expenditures of 
time and attention (etc). Something’s having required a certain amount of effort 
is one of the sorts of things that are often associated with its being worthy of 
being considered an achievement.  
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resultant wealth may be excessive relative to what he deserves, but he did play a 
sufficiently non-lucky role in acquiring that wealth.5  
 
 The cost of the agent’s commitment to the outcome also seems obviously 
relevant to the assessment of their achievements. As Maslen et al (2019) point 
out in their discussion of praise, it is common for people to think about the cost 
of commitment in terms of effort. But what is effort? Maslen et al define it as a 
psychological capacity to overcome aversive experiences. It takes a lot of effort, 
for example, to run a marathon. It is a physically and psychological demanding 
thing to do. Many times, as you are running, your body and mind will want to 
give up. You have to exert effort to overcome that desire to quit. Understood in 
these terms, effort is clearly relevant to assessing achievements. The more effort 
expended on producing an outcome, the greater the achievement seems to be. 
That said, as Maslen et al argue, it is also quite a limited way of looking at things. 
Effort isn’t the only way for an agent to commit to producing an outcome and 
sometimes effort may not be present in significant achievements. Compare, for 
example, an amateur first-time marathon runner to a professional. The amateur 
may have to exert far more effort (overcome more psychological aversion) than 
the professional to finish the race. This does not, however, make the amateur’s 
marathon a greater achievement. The professional will have shown their 
dedication to the race in other ways. They will have spent many hours training 
and honing their skills; they will have spent time away from their families and 
friends in order to improve their abilities. These are all forms of costly 
commitment and they all seem relevant to assessing the achievement. That said, 
we have to treat costly commitment with some degree of care. It is relevant to 
the assessment of an achievement but not necessary for it. As Maslen et al point 
out, for costly commitment to be relevant to the assessment it has to be non-
arbitrary. In other words, you cannot just make something arbitrarily more 
difficult in order to increase the amount of praise you are owed. In fact, 
sometimes, finding an easier, less costly way to produce the same outcome, can 
be an achievement in and of itself. We return to this point later on when we 
assess the impact of automation on achievement. 
 
 The voluntariness of the agent’s commitment to the outcome also seems 
like something that is obviously relevant to the assessment of an achievement 
because it signals a positive desire to achieve an outcome. Let’s return for a 
moment to Bill Gates. As is well-known, Gates has pledged to give most of his 
wealth away to charitable/good causes through the foundation he set-up with 
his wife. As far as we are aware, this pledge was entirely voluntary. No one 
forced him to do it. But suppose this were not true. Suppose it turned out that 
someone had held a gun to his head and demanded that he give away all his 
money. Would this make a difference to our assessment of the pledge? It might. 
The fact that he only gave away the money under significant pressure would 
seem to suggest that he doesn’t really deserve as much credit for it. That said, as 
with costly commitment, we have to be careful in how we factor voluntariness 
 
5 And, just to be clear, we are not claiming that Bill Gates’ amassing of that wealth 
is objectively valuable. We use him simply as an example of what it might mean 
to be a sufficiently non-lucky producer of an outcome.  
 10 
into our assessment of achievements. Just because an action is non-voluntary 
doesn’t mean it doesn’t count as an achievement. Someone might force an 
amateur to run a marathon at gunpoint. If the amateur runs the marathon (and 
completes it) this would still count as a significant achievement, given the degree 
of psychological effort it must have required to do so. The point, then, is that 
voluntariness is not the be all and end all of achievement. It is one of the factors 
that goes into the assessment. You must reach a holistic assessment of all four 
factors to determine whether there has been a significant achievement or not. 
 
 
4. How Automation Creates Achievement Gaps 
 
With this account in place, we are in a better position to assess the impact 
of workplace automation on achievement. Instead of asking the general question 
about how automation impacts on achievement we can ask the more specific 
question: how does automation impact on the four variables relevant to the 
assessment of achievements? Answering this will then enable us to reach a 
holistic assessment. To answer this question adequately, we need to link the 
discussion back to the different kinds of automation discussed in section 2. 
 
We can start with the trivial case: that of total replacement of human 
workers by machines. Clearly, in such cases, there is an end to certain kinds 
human achievement within the workplace. If a skilled manufacturing worker or 
service worker is replaced, entirely, by a machine, they no longer have access to 
any form of workplace achievement. Whatever achievements they used to 
associate with their job are now closed to them: they lose the ability to make a 
non-lucky causal contribution to a valuable output. They have to find other 
outlets for their talents. This is an uncomplicated and perhaps uninteresting case 
(though it leads to a complicating factor that we discuss in more detail below).  
 
The more interesting cases are the ones in which workers are not totally 
replaced by machines but are, instead, redeployed within the workplace so that 
they have to collaborate with machines in different ways. In all cases of 
collaboration, human workers perform tasks that (a) produce outcomes in their 
own right and (b) have some causal relevance, even if indirect, to the outcomes 
produced by the machines (and therefore of the workplace as a whole). There is, 
consequently, a valid question to be asked about whether they still have access 
to achievement through their work. What we will now argue is that even in cases 
of collaborative displacement, the possibility of achieving things through your 
work can be significantly compromised through the use of automating 
technologies. This is because even in cases of collaborative displacement 
automation can negatively impact on three of the four variables that are relevant 
to the assessment of achievements in the workplace. 
 
Consider, first, the way in which automation can reduce the value of the 
outputs associated with the tasks performed by certain groups of human 
workers. The clearest example of this comes with maintenance forms of 
collaboration. Where once upon a time humans could be responsible for 
producing valuable commodifiable outputs, either through cognitive design of 
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those outputs or physical manufacture of their parts or, in the case of services, 
physical and cognitive performance of valuable services, when they shift to the 
maintenance role they necessarily take a peripheral role in the production of the 
valuable outputs. They keep the wheels of industry turning, but they do not play 
a direct role in the valuable activities. Consider, by way of analogy, the 
relationship between a touring musician and their road crew. The road crew 
plays an important part in setting up and testing the equipment that ensures the 
musician can play every night, but they are playing a support role to the activity 
that produces the real value – the musical performance. You would be hard 
pressed to argue that their tasks are more valuable than those of the musician. In 
the case of maintenance collaboration, human workers are relegated to an 
equivalent backstage role. They are the support crew not the performers. What 
they do may still be causally important, but it is not more valuable than the 
frontstage role they could have occupied.  
 
Similarly, in cases of order-following collaboration, it is reasonable to 
presume that there will be a loss of value in work-related outputs, relative to 
other, available forms of work. In the case of order-following collaboration, 
humans take a backseat to the creative, design or supervisory work. They 
become order-following, physical workers. The tasks they perform may well be 
causally important to the production of valuable outputs, but what they do is 
surely relatively less valuable. Why? Because in becoming order-following 
physical workers they lose the opportunity to exercise independence and 
creativity in their jobs. Indeed, there is something deeply ironic about order-
following collaboration. As Brett Frischmann and Evan Selinger (2018) have 
argued, one of the more noticeable effects that automation and digital technology 
has on human life is its tendency to reduce humans to ‘simple machines’ that 
perceive a stimulus and then respond in a predictable or limited way. Think, for 
example, of the Amazon warehouse worker who is given a set of customer orders 
and a route through the warehouse to pick up those orders that has been 
planned by an algorithm. They see the stimulus given to them by the machine 
and respond, not with creativity or foresight, but by just following the route that 
is recommended. They dare not second-guess the algorithm or exercise any 
creativity in case they are less efficient at their jobs (and are reprimanded for 
failing to follow the orders). Similar things are happening in other forms of work 
where algorithms play a key role in planning and coordinating the physical 
activity of workers, e.g. in ‘platform’ work such as that provided by companies 
like Uber and Deliveroo. 
 
The one major exception to this argument is the case of supervisory 
collaboration. Here, the humans would appear to retain creative control and 
mastery over the machines. They still use their cognitive abilities to design the 
valuable output and supervise its creation. While they may have outsourced the 
physical gruntwork to a machine, they still play a significant, non-lucky role in 
producing that output. But even in the case of supervisory collaboration there 
can be a loss. For one thing, it is worth noting that creative and supervisory 
forms of work are largely the preserve of an elite few workers and, indeed, one 
of the tragedies of automation may well be that it empowers these elite few 
workers to the disadvantage of the majority (Autor 2015; Loi 2015; Frey 2019). 
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Related to this, even in cases of supervisory collaboration, there can be a loss in 
the value of work-related outputs, depending on the form of automating 
technology in use. To return to the opening example of AlphaGo and Lee Sedol, 
one of the key features of the machine learning system used by the designers of 
AlphaGo is that it was largely independent of, and opaque to, its designers. In 
other words, AlphaGo learned how to play the game by itself, by extrapolating 
strategies and tactics from previous games, that were surprising to both its 
creators and professional Go-players. Thus, while the programmers did create 
the machine and supervised its use, they were not, in any meaningful sense, 
responsible for its specific successful moves within the game. If this form of 
automating technology becomes more widely used it can undermine the value of 
even supervisory forms of collaboration. 
 
This links to a second important argument about automation and 
collaborative displacement, namely: that automation, almost by necessity, 
reduces the cost of the human commitment to producing a workplace output. In 
some ways, this is the primary motivation for using automating technologies. 
They are supposed to reduce the need for certain forms of human effort and 
activity, and they are usually cheaper and more efficient than human workers in 
doing so (this is often the primary economic rationale for introducing them). But 
if costly commitment is one of the key variables for assessing the value of an 
achievement it would seem to follow that automation reduces the value of 
workplace related achievements for workers. The designers of AlphaGo would 
again appear to a case in point. They did not have to do the hard work of figuring 
out the optimal strategies to play in the game, nor did they have to code these 
strategies into the computer. Something similar is true for the worker who 
follows orders given to them by a machine. They do not have to do the hard work 
of planning routes or deciding on what needs to be done. They just implement 
the orders.  Think about the Uber driver. Unlike a traditional taxi driver, they do 
not need to drive around a city looking for potential customers. The software 
directs the customers to them and them to the customers. With the addition of 
mapping software, it even plans the driving route for them, and facilitates 
payment. This significantly reduces the cost of the commitment to producing the 
work output. 
 
There is, of course, an obvious counterargument to this. As noted earlier, 
costly commitment comes in a variety of forms and it is important to remember 
that even if one type of cost is reduced, other forms of cost could go up and 
compensate for this. In the earlier example of the marathon runner, we 
suggested that although the effort expended on each individual race might be 
lower for a professional runner than for an amateur runner, the professional will 
demonstrate their costly commitment in other ways (tougher, longer training 
regimes and so forth). Could something similar arise in the case of workplace 
automation? Could the automation of one type of work task increase costly 
commitment elsewhere in the workplace? This sounds plausible. It is not 
unusual to hear people complain that so-called ‘labour saving’ technologies have 
actually increased the demands on their work in other ways. So, for example, the 
Uber driver might argue that although the technology saves them from having to 
find customers and plan driving routes, they spend an increased amount of time 
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driving in order to earn a decent wage and have to invest more energy and effort 
in improving their customer service to boost the ratings they receive from 
passengers (Rosenblat 2019).  
 
There are several things to be said in response to this. First, as we noted 
earlier, costly commitment is not always and everywhere associated with an 
increase in the value of an achievement. Sometimes costs can be arbitrary or 
counterproductive. It could be that the additional costs imposed by workplace 
automation are of this form. For example, the Uber driver may have to spend 
more time driving because one of the effects of platform markets is reduced 
wages and job security (Weil 2014; Manyika et al 2016; Rosenblat 2019; Prassl 
2019). So the increased commitment is, in fact, an indication that the form of 
work has become less valuable in other ways. Second, even if costs are not 
arbitrary or counterproductive, we still have to ask where the additional costs 
are directed. Our previous argument held that one of the effects of workplace 
automation is a reduced value of the outputs associated with human work tasks. 
Increasing the cost of commitment to less valuable outputs would still amount to 
a net loss in the value of achievements associated with work. For example, the 
Amazon worker who expends significant physical effort running around a 
warehouse in order to fulfill customer orders would still seem to be losing out, 
relative to what might have been the case, because the activities they perform 
are less valuable in the overall scheme of things.  
 
This brings us to another argument about the impact of automation on 
achievement. A non-lucky causal contribution to an output is, as noted earlier, a 
relevant variable when it comes to assessing achievements. But again, almost by 
necessity, one of the things that automating technologies tend to do is to sever 
the causal connection between human activity and outputs. This is because 
automating technologies are introduced primarily to shift labour (physical or 
cognitive) from humans to machines. The classic case is that of the 
manufacturing robot that takes over the physical tasks of producing an industrial 
output such as an automobile. This manufacturing robot severs the connection 
between human workers and that output.6 The result is that the human workers 
can no longer claim a direct, non-lucky, causal role in producing the output that 
was previously earmarked as their achievement. This severing of the causal 
connection could be compensated for if the humans were given other, more 
valuable, things to do but, as per the previous arguments, this is may not be true 
for the majority of workers.  
 
What about the voluntariness condition on achievement? Could the rise of 
automating technologies in the workplace somehow compromise the 
voluntariness of work? It is hard to see how this could be the case, unless the 
machines become, in effect, slave-masters of humans.7 That said, it should be 
 
6 This brings to mind Marxist – and related – ideas of alienation – something we 
think would be worth exploring further, but that we will leave for some other 
occasion. For an overview of such ideas, see Leopold 2018. 
7 For relevant discussion of how some contemporary technologies might be 
thought to make people more like machines who follow instructions in a mind-
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noted that voluntariness of work is already compromised for many workers 
(Danaher 2019; Anderson 2017). Unless you are fortunate enough to have 
personal wealth that obviates the economic necessity of work, or have plenty of 
viable career options that mean you are not forced to choose among a narrow 
range of potential jobs/work tasks, your ability to freely choose work is already 
quite limited. Automation may exacerbate this, to some extent, by further 
narrowing the pool of viable options, and so automation may put pressure on the 
voluntariness of work, but we don’t rest too much weight on this here in making 
the case for achievement gaps since, as already noted, voluntariness does not 
necessarily undermine achievements. 
 
 
In sum, the introduction of automating technologies into the workplace 
has the potential to open up numerous achievement gaps. This is because 
automating technologies tend to reduce the value of the outputs associated with 
human work tasks, reduce the cost of the human commitment to producing 
valuable commodifiable outputs (or redirect costly commitment in arbitrary and 
counterproductive ways) and, ultimately, sever the causal connection between 
human workers and valuable outputs. This is a bad thing since achievement is a 
key component of meaningful work. The challenge from a policy perspective is to 
figure out what can be done to mitigate against this risk. We turn to that question 
next. 
 
 
5. What can we do about achievement gaps in the workplace? 
 
In this section, we sketch four possible responses to the achievement gap 
problem in the workplace. We emphasise that these are just sketches: things that 
might done to alleviate some of the problems discussed in the previous section. 
More work needs to be done to develop a comprehensive policy response. 
Nevertheless, we can give some guidance on the type of thing that should be 
done. 
 
The first possibility is to simply accept the threat to achievement and 
respond by emphasising other aspects of meaningful work. Earlier on, when 
discussing the phenomenon of meaningful work, we noted that achievement, 
while important, is not the only thing that makes work meaningful. Leading 
accounts of meaningful work suggest that it is a complex and multidimensional 
phenomenon. Meaningful work includes achievement of valuable outputs, to be 
sure, but it also includes a sense of community, gaining self-respect and 
recognition of one’s peers, mastering skills and having a high degree of 
autonomy in the performance of one’s work tasks (Smids, Nyholm and Berkers 
2020; Gheaus and Herzog 2016). While automation may reduce the significance 
of the achievements associated with one’s work-related tasks, we could 
 
less way, and who might potentially therefore be viewed as having these 
technologies as their masters, see Frischmann & Selinger 2018. For the idea of 
the master-slave dialectic in the context of human-technology interaction with a 
Hegelian twist, see also Coeckelbergh 2015. 
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compensate for this by trying to promote the other aspects of meaningful work. 
For example, the employee that is displaced by a machine could be given greater 
autonomy in their remaining work tasks, workplace training and performance 
management could focus on enabling them to master the skills associated with 
these new tasks, greater emphasis could be placed on workplace morale and 
camaraderie and so on. That said, this strategy does face two obvious problems. 
First, emphasizing these other aspects of meaningful work may ring hollow if an 
individual worker’s contribution to the workplace output is reduced. Sure, it’s 
nice to have more autonomy and good workplace moral, but what’s the point if 
all one is doing is stapling sheets of paper together (to continue an example from 
earlier in the paper)? Second, increased workplace automation may put pressure 
on other aspects of meaningful work too. For example, one may have fewer 
colleagues – and hence less of a sense of community – in a highly automated 
workplace. Likewise, ensuring that humans work smoothly with machines might 
require more worker surveillance and control, due to the risk that humans will 
misuse machines or machines pose a risk to humans.  This may, in turn, impact 
negatively on autonomy. 
 
The second possibility is that, even if machines play the main part in 
producing workplace outputs, we could find some residual ways for humans to 
play a valuable role in producing the final outputs. To put it another way, we 
could try to find a way for the ‘human touch’ to be retained in the automated 
workplace. For example, imagine a furniture factory that relies heavily on 
machines to manufacture tables and chairs. The machines produce safer and 
cheaper furniture than human workers ever could. Suppose though, at the very 
end of the manufacturing line, human workers add distinctive carvings or 
markings to the furniture. These workers are given a high degree of freedom and 
autonomy in doing this and hence are able to exercise their creativity when it 
comes to marking up the furniture. This could add something distinctive to the 
final product and allow human workers to play a meaningful role in production. 
Of course, work is not charity. We cannot simply dream up tasks just so that all 
products or service have some semblance of the human touch. But adding such 
distinctive markings to furniture may not be charity. Consumers may value a 
product that has unique features and includes the human touch.8 It may 
counterbalance some of the drab uniformity that is often associated with 
machine-manufactured goods. Indeed, setting up the workplace in this way may 
enable us to get the best of both worlds: the efficiency of machines and the 
creative imperfections of humans. 
 
The third possibility is that we place greater emphasis on the role of 
teams in producing workplace outputs. This isn’t really a way of addressing the 
problems outlined in the previous section but, rather, a way of reframing them 
so that they seem less problematic. One criticism that could be made of our 
arguments in the previous section is that they adopt an overly individualistic 
 
8 An anonymous reviewer points out to us that there is, in fact, a furniture 
company – Sticks, Inc – whose unique selling point is that every piece they sell is 
finished with hand-drawn artwork. See https://sticks.com for more details. We 
thank the reviewer for this reference. 
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understanding of achievement and meaningful work: in order for my work to be 
meaningful I must play a significant role in producing the valuable output. This 
was perhaps most clearly on display in the dismissive comments we made about 
support crew and stage performers. But maybe this is the wrong way of looking 
at it? Many of the great achievements of human history have been collective 
efforts not solo runs. No person is an island unto themselves. We all depend on 
and rely on others to get things done. If any link in the collective chain gets 
damaged, the final product suffers. Maybe we just need to reflect on that reality 
more and accept that collaborative displacement by machines doesn’t 
undermine achievement as much as we supposed. Perhaps we can still feel like 
we are a valuable part of the team producing the output, even if the tasks we 
perform are different? Perhaps. But, again, this might ring hollow to those who 
find themselves redeployed to more marginal and peripheral roles within the 
team. The tasks they perform will need to feel somehow essential to the 
collective effort (a necessary part of a sufficient set of causes of the output). 
 
The final possibility is that we try to find other avenues for achievement 
outside the workplace. This may be the ultimate solution to the problem. The 
argument developed in this paper has worked from the assumption that work 
plays a central role in people’s lives and that it is one of the main forums in 
which they can achieve valuable outputs. This may be true given the current 
economic realities but maybe it doesn’t have to be true in a world of widespread 
workplace automation (Danaher 2019)? With fewer demands on humans in the 
workplace it may be possible for us to dedicate more time to other methods of 
achieving valuable outputs, e.g. hobbies, sports, artistic endeavours, family 
projects and so on. This links, importantly, to the voluntariness condition for 
praise. One of the problems noted above is that work is often not a voluntary 
choice for many people: it is an economic and practical necessity. But if 
automation could free us from that necessity, we might be able to choose our 
own paths to achievement. That said, one of the features of the argument we 
made in the previous section is that it is generalizable. We focused on 
achievement gaps in the workplace but, in principle, the use of automating 
technologies in other domains may open up additional achievement gaps. This 
may reduce the viability of this final strategy (cf Danaher 2019, ch 4 and ch 7). 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Achievement is an important part of the well-lived life. It is the positive 
side of responsibility. Where we blame ourselves and others for doing bad 
things, we also praise ourselves for achieving positive (or value neutral) things. 
Achievement is particularly important when it comes to meaningful work. One of 
the problems with widespread automation is that it threatens to undermine at 
least three of the four main conditions for achievement in the workplace: it can 
reduce the value of work tasks; reduce the cost of committing to those work 
tasks; and sever the causal connection between human effort and workplace 
outcome. This opens up ‘achievement gaps’ in the workplace. There are, 
however, some potential ways to manage the threat of achievement gaps: we can 
focus on other aspects of meaningful work; we can find some ways to retain the 
human touch in the production of workplace outputs; we can emphasise the 
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importance of teamwork in producing valuable outputs; and we can find outlets 
for achievement outside of the workplace. 
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